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THE ROLE AND REJECTION OF A CLAIM




Over the years, the Supreme Court ("Court") has been
ambivalent in its decisions on the claim for third party standing.'
Two cases of particular relevance on this issue, Singleton v. Wulff
and Powers v. Ohio, establish the framework for third party
standing analysis. 2 The Singleton Court considered several
requirements to determine if the plaintiff had a valid third party
standing. One was whether the plaintiff had suffered concrete
"injury in fact" as to "make [the suit] a case or controversy," and
another, whether the plaintiff had standing to base his claim or
defense on the third parties' rights. 3 Criticizing the majority's
misinterpretation of previous cases, Justice Powell in the
dissenting opinion argued that the assertion of third party rights is
proper only when it is "in all practicable terms impossible" for the
third parties to do so themselves and not merely based on some
"obstacle." 4
Again in 1991, the Court readdressed the same issue in
Powers, only this time to craft specific steps for the present day's
third party standing analysis. Drawing from the language of
Singleton, the three-pronged test for obtaining third party standing
requires that the litigant must have suffered an "injury in fact" that
* A J.D. candidate at the University of Buffalo School of Law; D.D.S.,
Columbia University School of Dental & Oral Surgery; M.P.H., Columbia
University School of Public Health; Molecular and Cell Biology, A.B.,
University of California, Berkeley.
Marc Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third-
Party Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV.
393, 462 (1981).
2 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991).
3 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 111-13.
4 Id. at 126-27.
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adversely affects the outcome of the case, that the litigant must
have a "close relation[ship]" with the third party, and that there
must be a hindrance that prevents the third party from asserting his
own rights. 5 Unlike the personal relationship between individuals,
a close relationship is one that links the litigant's advocacy to the
third party's rights.6 The hindrance prong, meanwhile, verifies the
third party's inability to assert his own rights and not just his
unwillingness to do so. 7 In all, Justice Scalia accurately summed
up the Court's continuing ambivalence on third party standing in
Miller by asserting that "[the Court's] law on [the] subject is in
need of... clarification. .. ,,8
The decision to grant third party standing by federal courts
or even the Court itself is a matter of judicial prudence and has yet
to reach the level of constitutional significance. 9 Prudence rather
than the Constitution allows courts to ease the strict requirements
for third party standing when a "law will stifle protected speech. 10
Writing for the majority in Warth v. Selden, Justice Powell
expressed his concerns about the possible lack of judicial restraint
exercised by federal courts in determining third party standing, as
he had stated:
Without such limitations ... essentially [related] to
matters of judicial self-governance, the courts
would be called upon to decide abstract questions of
wide public significance even though other
governmental institutions may be more competent
to address the questions and even though judicial
intervention may be unnecessary to protect
individual rights. 11
5 Powers, 499 U.S. at 410-11.6 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972).
7 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116.
8 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 455 n. 1 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
9 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249, 255 (1953).
10 Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 509 (7' h Cir. 1996).
1" Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
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Thus, three principles of judicial restraints or "prudential"
considerations were established to prevent federal courts from
getting involved in the resolution of abstract questions. 12 Of the
three prudential considerations, the third is most relevant to third
party standing analysis because it requires courts to determine
whether the litigant is actually asserting his own rights and
interests rather than those of the third parties. 13
THE CLAIM FOR THIRD PARTY STANDING:
Perry v. McGinnis
While third party due process was never expressly sought
by the appellant, Everett Perry ("Perry"), in his suit against his
employer, the Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"),
for wrongful termination, the factual findings in Perry v. McGinnis
provide an ideal opportunity to examine the rule of third party
standing. 14 Perry, a black man, worked as a disciplinary hearing
officer for the MDOC for a few years before he was fired on
November 5, 1993.15 His duties were to preside over and dispose
of cases at disciplinary hearings in Michigan state prisons. 16 Perry
argued that he was increasingly cited by prison officials for
substandard job performance when they noticed that his dismissal
rate was higher than the norm. 17 He claimed that the MDOC
denied prison inmates their due process rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment by implementing the unwritten guilty
verdict quotas and terminating him to eliminate fairness and
impartiality in the disciplinary proceedings.' 8 Judge Damon Keith
who presided over the case commented that such a disciplinary
system "reeks [prison inmates] of arbitrary justice [and that there]
12 Id. at 500.
13 Saladin v. Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 690 (11 h Cir. 1987).
14 Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2000).
"5 Id. at 600.
16 id.
17 Id. at 605.
18 Id.
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can only be injustice."' 19 It is only appropriate, hereafter, to discuss
whether Perry would have satisfied each prong of the Powers
analysis to succeed on the claim for third party standing.
The first prong establishes that the litigant must have
suffered an "injury in fact" resulting from the infringement of his
right z. In the present case, Perry asserted that prison officials
terminated his employment in retaliation for his failure to abide by
the unwritten quota policy.2' Instead of blindly following some
unofficial guidelines at the disciplinary hearings, he chose to
decide cases on the basis of fairness and impartiality. 22  As a
constitutional matter, his decisions on disciplinary actions taken
against prison inmates constitute his own expression protected by
the First Amendment. 23 Prison officials, therefore, violated his
freedom of expression and as a result caused him to suffer an
injury by wrongful termination.
Another argument to prove Perry's satisfaction of the first
prong is the racial discrimination against him. Evidence from the
case indicates that while many of Perry's white colleagues
committed the same errors under similar circumstances, he was the
only one being disciplined. 24 Perry's race best explains this
disparate treatment by prison officials. Yet, the Court of Appeals in
this case was uncertain if the "disparate treatment . . . had
[anything] to do with race" or the result of other factors. 25
Whether or not race is the deciding factor, Perry must have been
psychologically traumatized for being treated so differently than
his colleagues. He suffers a mental injury. Thus, the first prong is
satisfied from the facts of the case.
The condition of the second prong requires stricter scrutiny
of the relationship between the litigant and third party. The "close
relationship" between the two parties is not the kind one would
'9 Id. at 606.
20 Powers, 499 U.S. at 4 10-11.
21 Perry, 209 F.3d at 603-05.
22 Id. at 605.
23 Id. at 603.
24 Id. at 601-02.
25 Id. at 602.
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think of as personal affection; rather, the litigant's advocacy of his
own interest is linked to the third party's rights. 26 The Court in
Powers went further to clarify that the litigant can raise the third
party's rights only when there is a "congruence of interests [to]
,27make it necessary and appropriate." Two preceding cases,
Griswold and Eisenstadt, elaborate on this concept of relationship.
First in Griswold, the Court recognized the "professional
relationship" that the Executive Director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut and a licensed physician had
with the married couples to which they prescribed contraceptives.
2 8
At the time, the Connecticut statute prohibited anyone from
preventing conception. 29 Citing other related cases where the
litigants' interests and the third parties' rights aligned, the Court
agreed that the appellants had standing to raise their counselees'
constitutional rights since the "confidential relation[ship]" between
them would allow appellants in their suit to protect "the rights of
husband and wife . . . [that otherwise would] be diluted or
adversely affected." 30
Even when a professional or confidential relationship does
not exist, this should not prevent a person from asserting another
party's rights. 31 In Eisenstadt, the defendant Baird exhibited
contraceptive articles and distributed a package of vaginal foam to
a young woman at the end of his lecture at Boston University. 32
Because Baird was neither a physician nor a pharmacist at the time
of the distribution, he was convicted for violating the Michigan
statute.33 The Court did not see how Baird's professional status
should prevent him from challenging the statute "in its alleged
discriminatory application to potential distributees." 34 Relying on
26 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 445.
27 Powers, 499 U.S. at 414.
21 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480-81.
29 Id at 480.
30 Id. at 481.
31 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 445.
32 Id at 440.
33 Id. at 442.
14 Id. at 444.
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Griswold, the Court likewise expressed its concerns about the
"impact of the litigation on the third party interests" rather than the
nature of the relationship between the litigant and the third party.
Baird's right to assert third party standing is important because his
legal challenge of the statute provided unmarried people who were
denied contraceptives in Michigan a "forum" to assert their own
rights. 35 Like in Griswold, the Court emphasized the intertwining
relationship between the litigant's advocacy and the third party's
rights.
A closer scrutiny of the case at bar, however, reveals that
Perry would not have satisfied the second prong. The nature of the
relationship in Griswold is one of physician-patient, where there
are certain elements of professionalism and confidentiality. Unlike
the characteristics of physician-patient and attorney-client
relationships, prison officials are often not so interested in inmates'
rights as much as enforcing their incarceration. 36 In Harris, the
inmate challenged the Georgia Department of Corrections ("DOC")
policy that prohibited prison officials from writing
recommendations on prisoners' behalf to the parole board. He
claimed that the policy violated the prison officials' First
Amendment right.37 The Court of Appeals reversed and held that
the inmate lacked standing to assert the free speech rights of prison
guards. The court argued against granting third party standing
because of the "adversarial nature of the relationship between
prisoners and prison [officials]. '' 38 Similarly, Perry's relationship
with the inmates can be characterized as adversarial. As a
disciplinary hearing officer, Perry could not have formed any type
of relationship with the inmates if he were also to decide on
disciplinary actions taken against them. There has to be an
adversarial mentality of prison officials against inmates in order to
maintain fairness and impartiality in the course of disciplinary
hearings.
31 Id at 445-46.
36 Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1123 (1 It' Cir. 1994).
37 Id. at 1120.
31 Id. at 1123-24.
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Other than the nature of relationship between the litigant and third
party, the main factor to stress is the alignment of interests between
the two parties, such that the litigant "will adequately and
vigorously assert those interests."3 9 This is lacking in the instant
case because disciplinary hearings, in a sense, allow prisoners at
the minimum to defend their own rights without relying on the
litigants. The third parties' and litigants' interests intertwined in
Griswold and Eisenstadt because the third parties were denied a
"forum" to assert their constitutional rights.40 On the other hand,
the disciplinary hearings in Perry probably provide inmates a
"forum" to defend the misconduct charges against them.
According to the rules of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, another
kind of "forum" available is the administrative proceeding that
prisoners can request to remedy the rights they feel have been
violated. 1 Given the prison inmates' appearance before the
disciplinary board, they seemingly do not lack a standing to assert
their own rights. A disciplinary hearing therefore represents the
kind of "forum" that was previously denied to third parties in
Griswold and Eisenstadt.
Another consideration is that the litigant should be a
zealous advocate of the third party's rights. 4 There cannot be
effective advocacy when a person is also the judge of another
party's misconduct. Advocacy requires that person to share the
third party's interest and to defend it zealously. On the contrary, a
judge has to remain fair and impartial to all parties. That being so,
Perry cannot assume both roles and also argues that the redress of
his wrongful termination on the claim for third party standing will
result in the inmates'greater enjoyment of their due process rights.
Here, the interests of a judge and an advocate diverge. Perry's role
as a disciplinary hearing officer is to judge the inmates'
misconduct, while the advocacy of their due process rights may
merely exist as an afterthought of his claim for remedy. In sum, as
'9 Id at 1124-25.
40 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 445-46.
41 Massey v. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1033 (7"h Cir. 2000).
42 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 445.
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long as there is "an adversarial nature of relationship between
prisoners and prison [officials], and the differing interests of the
two groups," the second prong cannot be satisfied.43
Lastly, it is difficult to determine with certainty if Perry
would also have satisfied the hindrance prong. The rule states that
the third party must be unable to assert his own rights and is notjust reluctant to do so. 44 Based on the language in Singleton and
Powers, hindrance need not be absolute, but the slightest evidence
of it is justifiable. The best argument for evidence of hindrance in
Perry is that the institutional secrecy among prison officials about
the unwritten guilty verdict quotas denied prison inmates and Perry
alike access to information that may be relevant to their
performance or defense in the disciplinary hearings.
Even so, federal courts provide inmates procedural means
to rectify any hindrance that they might have confronted. In
Massey, prison officials denied the plaintiff federal prisoner access
to surgical care for a hernia upon the prison physician's
recommendation. The plaintiff claimed that they violated his
Eighth Amendment rights.45 The court, however, held that his
claim was insufficient because he failed to first exhaust his
administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act. 46 Courts are not particularly concerned about the
"effectiveness" or the prisoners' satisfaction with the
administrative grievance procedure as much as its "availability" to
them. The prison system's administrative procedure affords
prisoners their due process or, in other words, an opportunity to
assert their rights. A remedy from that process redresses any wrong
that the hindrance might have caused initially.
It is unclear from the present case if the disciplinary
hearings resemble the kind of administrative grievance procedure
where prisoners at the very least can assert their own rights. If
there is no similarity between the two proceedings, the next
43 Harris, 20 F.3d at 1123.
44 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116.
45 Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 1999).
46 Id. at 731-34.
47 Id. at 733-34.
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question is whether prisoners are even granted the right to petition
for appeal after their disciplinary hearings. Because these questions
are left unanswered, this raises serious doubts about Perry's ability
to satisfy the third prong.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST ON THIRD PARTY STANDING
There should be a public interest in third party standing
because it involves one of America's largest public institutions-
the prison system. Moreover, the vast majority of cases involving
third party standing deal with constitutional rights. 48 One in
particular is prisoners' due process rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Another is a public employee's obligation
to maintain "constitutionally mandated fairness" in disciplinary
hearings, though it may deviate from his public employer's
policy.4 9 Those rights erode when prison officials like in Perry
have the arbitrary power to implement an unofficial policy without
oversight by at least one branch of the government.
The Court has always been deeply concerned about the
abuse of arbitrary power by government officials. The original
intent of the law of due process prior to its roots in American
jurisprudence was to protect the common people against the
English king's arbitrary power. 50 As due process applies to
legislative power and perhaps to those of other public institutions
as well, its purpose is to "secure the citizen against any arbitrary
deprivation of his rights ...[and] to exclude everything that is
arbitrary and capricious. ' 51 Writing for the majority in Yick Wo,
Justice Matthews best stated:
When we consider the nature and theory of our
institutions of government, the principles upon
which they are supposed to rest, and review the
history of their development, we are constrained to
48 See Rohr, supra note 1, at 461.
49 Perry, 209 F.3d at 605.
50 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1889).
51 id.
2002-2003
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal
conclude that they do not mean to leave room for
the plaZ, and action of purely personal and arbitrary
power.
The public also benefits when the law is applied properly to
the claim for third party standing. A greater consistency and clarity
in the application of the law to third party standing will simplify
the legal R roceedings and be more cost-effective for all parties
involved. A claim for third party standing is achievable only
when the litigant satisfies all three prongs of the analysis set forth
in Powers. While Perry proved that he suffered an "injury in fact"
as required in the first prong, he failed to satisfy the conditions of
the remaining two. Thus, it is unlikely that he would succeed on
this claim in his suit.
Additionally, there has to be a "reasonable" standard in the
claim for third party standing. A good reason for one is to exclude
those litigants, who being opportunists, may manipulate third
parties' rights for their own personal benefits, or that they simply
do not have better alternative claims in bringing suits against other
parties. The claim for third party standing should be granted by
federal courts only if "[the] litigant .. . reasonably . . .gives
adequate representation to the interests of the third parties whose
rights [he] wishes to assert."54 In every situation that involves a
claim for third party standing, strict scrutiny is justified to ensure
that not every litigant can base his claim frivolously on the
assertion of third party rights.
52 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
53 See Rohr, supra note 48, at 463.
14 Id. at 461.
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